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 A New Progressivism 
 




 Based on an address for a conference on Law and Transformation in South Africa, this paper 
explores problems with two twentieth-century approaches to government: the way of markets and the 
way of planning. It urge that the New Progressivism simultaneously offers (1) a distinctive conception 
of government’s appropriate means, an outgrowth of the late-twentieth-century critique of economic 
planning, and (2) a distinctive understanding of government’s appropriate ends, an outgrowth of 
evident failures with market arrangements and largely a product of the mid-twentieth-century critique 
of laissez faire. It emphasizes the need to replace bans and commands with appropriate incentives, and 
to attend to social norms and social meanings in leading human behavior in welfare-promoting 
directions. The ultimate goal is to promote some of the goals associated with America’s New Deal and 
Europe’s social democracy, but without using the crude, inflexible, and often counterproductive 
methods associated with those approaches. Some attention is devoted to the effects of globalization, the 
AIDS crisis, crime prevention, and the role of economic growth.  
 
Introduction: Means and Ends 
 
The German psychologist Dietrich Dorner has done some fascinating experiments 
designed to see whether people can engage in successful social engineering.1 Dorner’s 
experiments are run via computer. Participants are asked to solve problems faced by 
the inhabitants of some region of the world; the problems may involve poverty, poor 
medical care, inadequate fertilization of crops, sick cattle, insufficient water, or 
excessive hunting and fishing. Through the magic of the computer, many policy 
initiatives are available (improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, drilling 
more wells), and participants can choose among them. Once particular initiatives are 
chosen, the computer projects, over short periods and then over decades, what is 
likely to happen in the region.  
In these experiments, success is entirely possible; some initiatives will actually 
make for effective and enduring improvements. But most of the participants—even 
the most educated and professional ones—produce calamities. They do so because 
                                                 
* This paper is based on a keynote address on a conference on Law and Transformation in South 
Africa; readers are asked to make allowances for a paper originally intended for oral presentation. I am 
grateful to Lesley Wexler for superb research assistance and to Martha Nussbaum and Theunis Roux 
for many helpful comments and discussions. 
1 Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (1997). 
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they do not see the complex, system-wide effects of particular interventions. For 
example, they may see the importance of increasing the number of cattle, but once 
they do that, they create a serious risk of overgrazing, and they fail to anticipate that 
problem. They may understand full well the value of drilling more wells to provide 
water, but they do not anticipate the energy and environmental effects of the drilling, 
which then endangers the food supply. Only the rare participant is able to see a 
number of steps down the road—to understand the multiple effects of one-shot 
interventions into the system. 
 
NOT A MIDPOINT 
 
Since the 1980s, many nations have been concerned to make three transitions. The 
first involves the shift from an authoritarian system to some kind of democracy. The 
second involves the creation of a secure system of individual rights. The third 
involves the introduction of reforms that will promote economic growth.  The 
relationships among the three transitions are complex and contested. Are rights 
necessary for democratic self-government, or antithetical to it? Might democracy 
undermine economic growth, at least if people are demanding measures that will 
make prosperity less likely? Will a stable system of rights weaken, or strengthen, the 
prospects for economic development? 
My goal in this essay is to elaborate an understanding of government’s role 
that promises, at once, to strengthen individual rights, to promote democratic self-rule, 
and to increase economic growth. With some trepidation, I will use describe this 
understanding as a New Progressivism. New Progressivists attempt to combine an 
appreciation of a great lesson of the first half of the twentieth century, the failure of 
markets, with an appreciation of the great lesson of the second half of the twentieth 
century, the failure of planning. New Progressivists offer a certain conception of both 
rights and democracy. They understand rights to include freedom from desperate 
conditions; they understand democracy to require a certain measure of deliberation 
and reflection, rather than automatic responses to what the public currently wants. 
Because freedom from desperate conditions is a right, they are concerned that total 
reliance on is connected with a failure to protect individual rights. They also think that 
a deliberative democracy will supplement markets, and hence that a system of market 
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ordering alone does not allow a proper domain for democratic self-rule. The failure of 
planning is simultaneously a  failure in terms of economics, democracy, and rights. 
I urge that the New Progressivism simultaneously offers (1) a distinctive 
conception of government’s appropriate means, an outgrowth of the late-twentieth-
century critique of economic planning, and (2) a distinctive understanding of 
government’s appropriate ends, an outgrowth of evident failures with market 
arrangements and largely a product of the mid-twentieth-century critique of laissez 
faire. For this reason the New Progressivism should not be seen as a compromise 
between right and left, or as an effort to seek some midpoint between those who 
believe in markets and those who reject them. Far from being a compromise or a 
midpoint, the New Progressivism offers both means and ends of its own. 
With respect to means, the New Progressivism rejects approaches prominently 
associated with both social democracy and the New Deal, on the ground that they are 
frequently ineffective or even counterproductive, especially from the economic point 
of view.  To the New Progressivists, social democrats are too often like participants in 
Dorner’s experiments, compromising economic and other goals without much sense 
of what they are doing. Those who endorse the New Progressivism are insistently 
focused on consequences, and they know that initiatives designed to help people who 
need help might backfire in practice—and that good intentions are no excuse for bad 
consequences. Above all, those who endorse the New Progressivism have learned 
from the past fifty years of experience with markets and with efforts to discipline and 
constrain markets. They are alert to side effects and unintended harmful 
consequences. Wherever possible, they attempt to use market-oriented strategies, 
enlisting markets on behalf of human interests—not because those strategies are 
morally superior, and not because markets have special moral claims (they do not), 
but because such strategies are likely to work. New Progressivists believe that if 
economic growth is a goal, markets should be enlisted far more often than they now 
are.  
It follows that New Progressivists are alert to the central role of civil society, 
and especially to the importance of social norms, which often drive private behaviour 
and which can change, for better or worse, over time. They are also skeptical, on both 
economic and democratic grounds, of command-and-control regulation and of 
aggressive interference with the labour market. They want to supplement markets, not 
 4 
 
to displace them. They favour such initiatives as the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) and housing subsidies for the poor, and they are cautious about a high 
minimum wage and rent control legislation. They believe that environmental 
problems should be handled through economic incentives, not through centralized 
mandates, which invite protectionism and interest-group maneuvering. Thus, for 
example, the New Progressivism 
• attempts to control problems associated with social norms, such as crime, unsafe 
sex, and other risk-taking behavior, through democratic efforts at norm 
management, often involving public-private partnerships; 
• places the highest possible premium on education and training;  
• rejects economic protectionism;  
• favors incentives rather than centralized governmental commands;  
• attempts to ensure flexibility in the labour market if and on the ground that it helps 
low-income workers as well as others;  
• sees economic growth as a central (though far from exclusive) part of antipoverty 
policy. 
So much for means—what of ends? Those who endorse the New 
Progressivism seek initially to achieve an incompletely theorized agreement2—an 
agreement on various practices and initiatives capable of attracting support from a 
wide range of theoretical perspectives. Utilitarians, Kantians, those who begin from 
diverse theological positions, and numerous others can support the approach urged 
here. But to the extent that theoretical depth is required, New Progressivists will insist 
that markets should be identified with neither justice nor liberty. They do not think 
that markets will inevitably protect individual rights, especially because they believe 
that the right to be free from discrimination counts as a right, one that markets can 
promote. They see markets as operating against a background that includes 
considerable injustice, and also limited liberty. They think that to a large degree, 
market ordering will merely build on that unacceptable background.  
At the same time, New Progressivists have considerable sympathy for some of 
the rights emphasized by social democrats in Europe and New Dealers in the United 
States: decent life prospects for all, a social safety net, a safe environment, genuine 
equality of opportunity. But they believe that these rights have often been quite murky 
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and ill defined—and also that they have been confused, too often, with a kind of 
freestanding egalitarianism, concerned to ensure equal economic outcomes as such. 
Those who believe in a New Progressivism insist on an acceptable floor for everyone. 
But they are not much concerned with large disparities in wealth, not because these 
are fair, but because the much more important goal is to ensure decent outcomes for 
all, and because allowing such disparities may well be necessary to provide 
appropriate incentives.  
To those who believe in a New Progressivism, what is most necessary is to 
ensure that basic human capabilities do not fall below a certain, reasonably generous 
threshold.3 To this New Progressivists add a distinctive conception of equality, one 
that forbids second-class citizenship, or lower caste status, for members of any group. 
This anticaste principle makes sex equality a singularly high priority, as a means for 
economic development and an end in itself. The rights embodied in the anticaste 
principle are indispensable to growth. They promote democracy as well. For these 
reasons, the New Progressivists hope to offer a conception of government that 
simultaneously promote democratic and economic goals, and that does so without 
compromising individual rights, properly conceived. Of course these various ideas 
can be specified in ways that will lead to intense conflicts among them. New 
Progressivists attempt a specification that will reduce the conflicts, seeing rights, for 
example, as a precondition for democracy and growth, and seeing growth as an 
(imperfect) ally of rights. 
 
OF MESS AND MENACE 
 
There has of course been a great deal of recent discussion, both supportive and 
critical, of what a ‘Third Way’ might involve. What I am calling the New 
Progressivism has an obvious relationship to the idea of a Third Way, especially 
insofar as those who endorse Third Way thinking tend to be receptive to markets and 
growth at the same time that they are committed to improving the rights of 
disadvantaged people. I do not intend here to summarize that discussion, or to endorse 
                                                                                                                                            
2 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996). 
3 See Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (1999); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development (1999); Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics (2000). 
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the Third Way programme.4 What I mean to do instead is to develop a freestanding 
account of what a New Progressivism might be understood to entail.  
The American law professor Karl Llewellyn is said to have said, ‘Technique 
without morals is a menace; but morals without technique is a mess.’ This is a fitting 
criticism of some of the experiments in social democracy of the last several decades; 
it is a shorthand description of the failures of many participants in Dorner’s 
experiments, failures with parallels in the economic and democratic disasters brought 
about by twentieth-century ‘planners’ of various stripes. But Llewellyn is also said to 
have said: ‘Morals without technique is a mess; but technique without morals is a 
menace.’ This is a fitting criticism of many twentieth-century experiments in social 
engineering, but it is a criticism too of excessive reliance on free markets. The real 
task, for those interested in a New Progressivism, involves development of 
approaches and methods that are neither menace nor mess.  
Recent debates, including debates over the Third Way, have drawn attention to 
two possible strategies for dealing with markets: to leave them alone or to displace 
them. But the dichotomy is much too simple; in fact it is damagingly simple. It is too 
simple, first, because the idea of ‘displacing’ markets conceals a range of options, 
from nationalizing industries, to blocking certain deals, to limiting waivers, to 
providing information. It is too simple, second, because it is possible to complement 
rather than to displace markets—to provide institutions that do what markets do not 
do, and to help people who are failed by markets, an emphatically human institution. 
As Amartya Sen has written, very much in the spirit of the New Progressivism, ‘it is 
possible to argue at the same time both (1) for more market institutions, and (2) for 
going more beyond the market.’5  
With respect to methods and strategies, that is what I will be suggesting here. 
Throughout I will paint with an extremely broad brush, discussing many issues that 
could easily be treated in a short book, or even a long one. My hope is that the brisk 
and sometimes reckless treatment of many issues might make up for its otherwise 
unpardonable neglect of the trees, by providing a decent perspective on the forest, a 
                                                 
4 Two prominent discussions are Anthony Giddens, The Third Way (1998), and Giddens, ibid. In my 
view, Giddens offers too large a collection of ideas, a pastiche in fact, and too much of his discussion is 
platitudinous. Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, India (1997), does not bill itself in these terms, but it 
seems to me the best presentation of what a New Progressivism might actually look like. Cass R. 
Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (1997), is also intended to set out ideas in this direction. 
5 Sen and Dreze, ibid. at 28. 
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perspective that perhaps continues to be absent from existing treatments of possible 
twenty-first century ‘ways’. 
The plan of the essay is as follows. The second part offers a brief discussion of 
two familiar ‘ways’ and of what is wrong with them. Here globalization is seen to be a 
process that intensifies problems with both markets and planning, in a way that 
jeopardizes economic growth and also certain individual rights. The third part deals 
with social norms, especially in the context of crime prevention, HIV/AIDS, and 
related problems. The fourth part deals with employment policy and poverty.  The 
fifth part explores command-and-control regulation and some alternatives, especially 
in the context of environmental protection. The sixth part investigates the importance 
and limits of economic growth, with particular stress on the need to attend to human 
capabilities and sex equality. The seventh part is a brief conclusion. 
 
Two ‘Ways’—and Globalization 
 
THE WAY OF MARKETS AND THE WAY OF PLANNING 
 
If there is a New Progressivism, what is it opposing? There are two candidates. Let us 
understand the first to be a version of the Reagan-Thatcher programme, routed above 
all in the work of Nobel Prize winner Friedrich Hayek. Call this ‘the way of markets’.  
On this view, free markets are indispensable to liberty, rights, and economic 
growth. The role of the state is to create the preconditions for well-functioning 
markets, by establishing rights of private property and freedom of contract, by 
ensuring competition rather than monopoly, and by preventing force and fraud. 
Perhaps the government should also provide a social safety net, though a relatively 
weak one (to ensure proper work incentives). But according to those who endorse the 
way of markets, government should not interfere with the labour market through, for 
example, high minimum wage requirements or through special protections for labour 
unions. And those who endorse the way of markets place the highest possible 
premium on economic growth, on a particular, market-based conception of liberty, 
and on social ordering through market ordering, which they see as essential to growth 
and liberty alike. Of course there is a spectrum of possible approaches here, from 
those who reject a social safety net to those willing to accept an ample set of 
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protections for those at the bottom. What I mean to emphasize, sometimes captured in 
the idea of ‘neo-liberalism’, or ‘liberalization’, is the idea of placing primary 
emphasis on free markets and economic productivity. 
Like the way of markets, the way of planning is actually a spectrum of ‘ways’, 
ranging from Soviet-style centralized planning to those forms of social democracy 
(not excluding America’s) that are comfortable, in some areas, with nationalized 
industries, aggressive regulation of markets, price and wage controls, and most 
generally ‘planning’ of various kinds. As random examples, consider the following: 
• laws that make it difficult for employers to discharge employees; 
• laws that make it hard for landlords to evict tenants; 
• environmental regulation that specifies the technology that must be used by 
industry; 
• high minimum wage requirements; 
• tariffs; 
• public ownership of industry; 
• ceilings and floors on prices as a whole. 
Of course it is possible for a nation to adopt narrow or broad plans, or to be a 
planner in only a few small domains. A government that is generally skeptical of 
planning might conclude, for example, that it makes sense to have tariffs in some 
areas, or that agriculture should be protected with price supports, or that workers 
should be protected from discharge, or that technological requirements are properly 
placed on new cars, to reduce levels of air pollution. 
 
PROBLEMS AND STRESSES 
 
Let us now briefly explore some of the problems in both of these ‘ways’. For those 
who seek the way of markets, the initial difficulty is that markets should not be 
identified with liberty or with rights properly conceived. Markets operate against the 
backdrop set by existing distributions of resources, opportunities, and talents. When 
an employee is able to attract only a small amount of money for an hour’s work, it is 
surely wrong to say that liberty is respected if we simply respect the deal. To the 
extent that existing distributions are a product of a lack of liberty, market ordering is a 
problem, not the solution. Whether the deal should be disrupted is another question. 
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But what markets generate does not come, from the standpoint of liberty, with a stamp 
of approval.  
An equally fundamental problem is that the consequences of market ordering 
may not be so wonderful for many people, who will be left with bad opportunities and 
few resources. It should not be necessary to belabour this point. In any large nation, 
respect for market ordering will predictably produce a situation in which millions of 
people end up with low wages, long hours, and bad working conditions—if they end 
up with work at all. Of course a social safety net can help. But even if it is generous, it 
is not going to do all of what must be done. It will not, for example, protect people 
against unsafe working conditions, sexual harassment, pollution, or unfair 
discrimination. To the extent that the category of rights includes protection against 
some or all of these injuries, markets will compromise rights. Indeed we have every 
reason to believe that in some circumstances, markets will promote discrimination—
as, for example, when customers or coworkers would prefer someone of a certain race 
or gender.  
At the same time, democratic values are compromised by any effort to treat 
“the market” as sacrosanct. Put to one side the evident point that markets must be 
created by government, willing and able to protect private property and freedom of 
contract. A real problem is that a democratic citizenry will often want to supplement 
or displace markets, simply to protect the interests of some, many, or all. A 
commitment to market ordering will sharply diminish the terrain by which people 
make choices about the kind of society in which they will live. 
But planning faces difficulties of its own. One problem is that it is exceedingly 
likely to be vulnerable to pressures from self-interested private groups with stakes in a 
particular outcome. If so, democracy is jeopardized. It is very common, for example, 
to observe environmental regulation being turned into a mechanism for the 
distribution of benefits to groups whose interests have precious little to do with 
environmental protection.6 An even more fundamental problem has to do with the 
unintended bad consequences of the most well-motivated plans. ‘Planners’ are 
constantly surprised. To take just two examples, a law that makes it hard for 
employers to discharge employees is likely to make employers reluctant to hire people 
                                                 




in the first instance; a high minimum wage is likely to decrease employment.  The 
problem is pervasive, and it can lead to unfortunate consequences, especially for the 
disadvantaged.  We can understand the problem a bit better in light of Dorner’s work, 
showing the unfortunate systemic effects of one-shot interventions. Economic and 
social orders are systems, and the difficulty with plans is that their architects are 
infrequently able to foresee the consequences of their actions. 
Planners frequently refer to the unfairness of markets, and they are often right 
to do so. But a reference to unfairness should not be allowed to support laws that 
actually do no good. In Sen’s words, “The rhetoric of ‘equity’ has often been invoked 
to justify governmental interventions without any scrutinized political assessment of 
how these powers will be exercised and what actual effects they will have. In practice, 
these ill-directed regulations have not only interfered often enough with the efficiency 
of economic operations (especially of modern industries), they have also failed fairly 
comprehensively to promote any kind of real equity in distributional matters.”7 The 
point does not show that all plans are bad. But an overriding problem with the way of 
planning is simply that the consequences of plans are often bad from the perspective 
of well-meaning planners themselves. Plans may well violate rights, as has often been 
seen in Communist nations. But plans are often ineffectual too, and the result can be 
economic disaster. A low GDP is no ally of individual rights, especially if we 
understand poverty as a rights violation. 
 
THE ROLE OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
Thus far I have said nothing about globalization. (By the term I mean to refer, very 
simply, to the increasing mobility of persons, information, and products from one area 
of the globe to another.) What is the effect of globalization on the way of planning 
and the way of markets?  
The most important point is that with respect to markets and planning, global 
pressures produce a difference not of kind but of degree. We best think of a situation 
of globalization as ‘like ordinary domestic markets—only more so’. The major effect 
of global pressures is to intensify competition, so that stringent national regulation 
might well leave companies within the nation at a disadvantage both abroad and at 
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home. The resulting disadvantage might be reduced through protectionist measures, 
but these create familiar problems of their own, because they hurt local consumers (by 
increasing prices) and are likely, generally speaking, to harm the national economy.  
In fact globalization increases the problems associated with both of the two 
‘ways’. Insofar as markets produce rights violations of certain kinds, and bad results 
for millions of people, global pressures increase the difficulty. (Of course such 
markets also carry many benefits as well, for poor people as well as everyone else, 
especially insofar as the consequence is to cut prices.) If workers within the nation 
have to compete with everyone in the world, or in any case with a larger class of 
people, those without training and skills are going to be left further behind. At the 
same time, global pressures will inevitably confound ill-considered ‘plans’. Because 
markets are frequently global, the effects of plans will often be very different from 
what was sought and anticipated. This is a particular problem if, for example, an 
effect of stringent regulation of the labor market is to reduce the demand for domestic 
labour, thus hurting workers themselves. 
This is hardly a claim that states are incapable of governing in a global era. 
There is a great deal that they can do. Evidence simply does not support the claim that 
the increased mobility of capital has disabled national regulation. But it is a claim that 
the problems with the two ways are simultaneously compounded by the existence of 
global markets. 
 
THE ROLE OF COSTS: THE INEVITABLY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
RIGHTS AND MONEY 
 
Those who favour markets and those who favour planning often make a sharp 
distinction between ‘negative rights’ and ‘positive rights’. The former are said to be 
barriers to government action, and to that extent costless. The second are said to be 
entitlements to government protection, and to that extent costly. Market enthusiasts 
argue for the former and against the latter. Planners tend to argue for both.  
                                                                                                                                            
7 Sen and Dreze, n. 4 above, at 186. 
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From the standpoint of the New Progressivism (as well as from the standpoint 
of the Constitutional Court of South Africa8), both views suffer from a problem that is 
both conceptual and practical: along the relevant dimension, there is no difference 
between negative and positive rights. Both consist of entitlements to government 
action, and to that extent, both are costly. In a poor nation, both sorts of rights are at 
risk. Compare, for example, the right to free speech with the right to a minimum 
income. In a state of effective anarchy, or in a state without funds, neither right can 
exist. Of course the minimum income guarantee will lack taxpayer support. But the 
same is true for the right to free speech. Without a judiciary willing to protect people 
from public (as well as private) intrusions on freedom of speech, that freedom cannot 
exist. Without a state willing and able to prevent public marauders from silencing 
opposition, free speech is a chimera. Without public protection against private acts of 
violence against controversial statements, free speech is plainly absent.  
What is true for free speech is true for the whole universe of negative rights.9 
Consider, for example, two of the most quintessential liberal rights: the right to 
private property and the right to freedom of contract. Both of these depend not 
incidentally but essentially on government protection. Private property does not exist 
in the state of nature. It is a taxpayer-subsidized right, justified on the ground that it 
benefits individuals and society as a whole. People can make contracts without a 
strong state; but unless a legal system, subsidized by taxpayers, stands ready and able 
to ensure that contracts are enforced, what force are mere words likely to have? 
Those who believe in a New Progressivism know that all rights are costly and 
that a poor state cannot protect rights. One of the reasons why they favour a strong 
economy, and economic growth, is that these are important preconditions for ample 
rights protection. And in a rich or poor state, it follows that a central task for 
democratic self-government is to obtain the necessary funds and to ensure that they 
are allocated in a way that reflects sensible priority setting. The field of public finance 
is not separable from the field of democratic theory. 
 
                                                 
8 See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) S.A. 744 (CC) para 77. 
9 For detailed discussion, see Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights (1998). 
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Social Meaning and Social Norms (with Particular Reference to HIV/AIDS, 
Crime, Discrimination, and Environmental Protection) 
 
Those who endorse the way of markets have little to say about the relationship 
between government and civil society. Civil society is defined as equivalent to 
economic society. Thus market enthusiasts tend to rely on existing norms and 
preferences; this is part of their conception of laissez faire. Those who endorse the 
way of planning also have little to say about civil society, sometimes treating it as a 
domain that must be enlisted in the interest of social goals. But there is a better 
approach, one that promises to do what governments often seek to do, but at lower 
cost. Such an approach would emphasize several points: (1) the crucial importance of 
social norms in producing both desirable and undesirable behaviour; (2) the inevitable 
role of government in helping to constitute such norms; (3) the dependence of social 
norms on current information; (4) the often-rapid change in social norms over time; 
(5) the extent to which highly visible, or cognitively ‘available,’ examples and events 
can alter norms and behaviour; and (5) the possible use of government power to move 
norms in desirable directions.  
As we will see, these points help suggest such promising possibilities for 
controlling many social problems, including crime, HIV/AIDS, discrimination, and 
environmental protection. What I will be emphasizing here is the significance of 
social cascades, including norm cascades, in which social interactions can lead 
behaviour in dramatic directions. Sometimes such cascades are induced by new 
beliefs; sometimes they are induced by new understandings of the meaning of certain 
actions. Since people take their cues from the actions of others, and since they care 
about their reputations, certain policies can backfire, and certain others can have large 
and desirable effects. 
PROBLEMS WITH BANS, ECONOMIC AND OTHERWISE 
 
When government seeks to discourage certain conduct, what should it do? Those 
committed to planning generally have a simple answer: Forbid it. Those committed to 
markets provide the same answer, though they are reluctant to ask government to 
discourage private behaviour falling outside the basic categories of force and fraud. 
Those who believe in a New Progressivism think that the shared answer—‘forbid 
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it’—is much too simple, and in important ways misleading and even damaging, both 
to rights and to the economy. I am speaking here, then, of a promising but often 
overlooked means for promoting a range of social goals. 
New Progressivists do believe that incentives are important, and for anyone 
who believes that, it seems natural to think that if conduct is banned, there will be less 
of it. But bans create problems of their own. In some circumstances they can be self-
defeating, producing more of the behaviour that they seek to reduce. The reason is 
that behaviour is often driven by social norms, and hence by the signal that the 
behaviour carries; a ban can amplify the signal and increase the conduct. Suppose, for 
example, that people are engaging in certain harmful conduct precisely because the 
conduct is a way of defying authority and offering certain signals to relevant people. 
You might smoke, for example, precisely because smoking is, in some places, a 
dissident act; so too with a decision to engage in unsafe sex; so too for a decision to 
commit a crime. In short, actions have meanings, and the social meaning of action is 
an important determinant of what people will do and when they will do it.  (In the 
United States, some increases in risky sex have come from deliberate efforts at 
defying efforts to convince people to use condoms.) 
Many people will engage in conduct that they do not otherwise enjoy or value, 
because of the social meaning of engaging in it; many people will fail to engage in 
activity that they would enjoy or value, for exactly the same reason. If the social 
meaning of harm-avoiding activity is cowardice or capitulation, people are likely to 
refuse harm-avoiding activity. If the social meaning of harm-producing activity is 
boldness and independence, people are more likely to impose harms. In these 
circumstances any governmental effort to ‘forbid’ certain conduct might be futile or 
even counterproductive. If what is driving behaviour is its social meaning, the effect 
of a ban could be to increase it, by increasing the strength of the signal that is the 
motivation after all. Compare the finding that when people are paid to engage in 
certain desirable activity (cleaning up, for example, or arriving on time to pick up 
children from school), they will sometimes actually engage in that behaviour less 
rather than more, because the payment reduces the effect of the norm, which would 
otherwise have the effect of the payment. 
 




Those who seek a New Progressivism are especially interested in enlisting an 
understanding of social norms and social meanings in the service of improved 
policies, involving both rights and growth. They emphasize that in many domains, 
people frequently think and do what they think and do because of what they think 
(relevant) others think and do. Thus, for example, employees are more likely to file 
suit if members of the same workgroup have also done so10; teenage girls who see that 
other teenagers are having babies are more likely to become pregnant themselves11; 
littering and non-littering behavior appears to be contagious12; the same is true of 
violent crime13; those who know other people who are on welfare are more likely to 
go on welfare themselves14; the behaviour of proximate others affects the decision 
whether to recycle15; a good way to increase the incidence of tax compliance is to 
inform people of high levels of voluntary tax compliance16; and students are less 
likely to engage in binge drinking if they think that most of their fellow students do 
not engage in binge drinking, so much so that disclosure of this fact is one of the few 
successful methods of reducing binge drinking on university campuses in the United 
States.17  
Social influences affect behaviour via two different mechanisms. The first is 
informational. If many other people support a particular candidate, or refuse to use 
drugs, or carry guns, observers, and particularly observers within a common group, 
are given a signal about what it makes sense to do. The second mechanism is 
reputational, as group members impose sanctions on perceived deviants, and would-
                                                 
10 See Harold H. Gardner, Nathan L. Kleinman, and Richard J. Butler, ‘Workers’ Compensation and 
Family and Medical Leave Act Claim Contagion’, (2000) 20 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 89, 101-
10. 
11 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen and Michael L. Katz, ‘An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock 
Childbearing in the United States’, (1996) 111 Quarterly Journal of Economics 277. 
12 See R. Cialdini et al., ‘A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to 
Reduce Littering in Public Places’, (1990) 58 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1015. 
13 See Washington Post (December 1999).   [Exact date? Query author] 
14 See Marianne Bertrand, Erzo F.P. Luttmer and Sendhil Millainathan, Network Effects and Welfare 
Cultures (unpublished manuscript, April 9, 1998). 
15 See Ardith Spence, Wants for Waste (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1999). 
16 See Stephen Coleman, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment State Tax Results 
(Minnesota Department of Revenue, April 1996). 
17 See H. Wesley Perkins, ‘College Student Misperceptions of Alcohol and Other Drug Norms Among 
Peers’, in Designing Alcohol and Other Drug Prevention Programs in Higher Education (US 
Department of Education ed., 1997) 177-206; Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation’, (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 683, 767. A good outline of contagion 
effects can be found in Gardner, Kleinman and Butler, n. 9 above, at 91-4. 
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be deviants anticipate the sanctions in advance.18 Even when people do not believe 
that what other people do provides information about what actually should be done, 
they may think that the actions of others provide information about what other people 
think should be done. People care about their reputations, and hence they have an 
incentive to do what (they think) other group members think they should do. 
Reputational considerations may, for example, lead people to obey or not to obey the 
law, urge a certain view in group discussions, drive while drunk, help others, or talk 
about political issues in a certain way.  
The central question is how an understanding of these points might lead 
policies in better directions. What is especially promising is the possibility of 
achieving a ‘tipping point’, in which large numbers of people end up moving in novel 
directions.19 People typically have different ‘thresholds’ for choosing to believe or do 
something new or different. As those with low thresholds come to a certain belief or 
action, people with somewhat higher thresholds join them, possibly to a point where a 
critical mass is reached, making groups, possibly even nations ‘tip’.20 The result of 
this process can be to produce snowball or cascade effects, as small or even large 
groups of people end up believing something—even if that something is false—
simply because other people seem to believe that it is true. Real world phenomena 
also seem to have a great deal to do with cascade effects.21 Consider, for example, 
smoking, participating in protests, striking, recycling, using birth control, rioting, 
choosing what to put on television,22 even leaving bad dinner parties.23 We can 
understand certain people, in the private and public sectors, as ‘norm entrepreneurs’, 
seeking to give certain signals to many people, and in the process helping to shift 
norms in a desirable direction. 
With respect to policy tools, of special note is the availability heuristic: people 
tend to think that an event is more likely if an incident of its occurrence can readily be 
                                                 
18 See George Akerlof, ‘A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment May Be One 
Consequence’, in George Akerlof, An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales (1984) 69.    
19 See Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point (2000), for a popular overview. 
20 See Mark Granovetter, ‘Threshold Models of Collective Behavior’, (1978) 83 American Journal of 
Sociology 1420; for a recent popular treatment, see ibid. at 5-22. 
21 See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., ‘A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as 
Informational Cascades’, (1992) 100 Journal of Political Economy 992; Kuran and Sunstein, n. 16 
above, at 715-35. 
22 See Kennedy, supra note.  [Query author] 
23 Several of these examples are discussed in Kuran and Sunstein, n. 16 above, at 725-35, and in 
Granovetter, n. 19 above, at 1422-24, 
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brought to mind. It is for this reason that a single, highly publicized event can have 
important behavioual consequences, as when disclosure that a famous athlete or actor 
is HIV-positive can make thousands or even millions of people change their behavior. 
The single incident makes the risk seem both higher and more salient. It can even 
change the meaning of action. ‘Availability entrepreneurs’ can draw public attention 
to individual persons and cases, with the self-conscious goal of producing ‘availability 
cascades’, with which perceptions, by millions of people, can simultaneously shift. In 
the United States, this has happened with fear of abandoned hazardous waste dumps 
and nuclear power, as well as HIV/AIDS; Thailand used the strategy successfully in 
the later context.24 
There is a closely related phenomenon: group polarization. It has been shown 
that any group of like-minded people, after deliberating with one another, tends to end 
up believing a more extreme version of what they thought before they spoke together. 
Consider some examples of the basic phenomenon, known as group polarization, 
which has been found in over a dozen nations.25  (a) A group of moderately 
profeminist women will become more strongly profeminist after discussion.26 (b) 
After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and its 
intentions with respect to economic aid.27 (c) After discussion, whites predisposed to 
show racial prejudice offer more negative responses to the question whether white 
racism is responsible for conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.28 
(d) After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more 
positive responses to the same question.29  
As statistical regularities, it should follow, for example, that those moderately 
critical of an ongoing war effort will, after discussion, sharply oppose the war; that 
those who believe that global warming is a serious problem are likely, after 
                                                 
24 See Kuran and Sunstein, n. 16 above. 
25 See Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes’, 110 Yale Law Journal 
171 (2000). These include the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, and France. See, e.g., 
Johannes Zuber et al., ‘Choice Shift and Group Polarization’, (1992) 62 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 50 (Germany); Dominic Abrams et al., ‘Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who 
You Are’, (1990) 29 British Journal of Social Psychology 97, 112 New Zealand).  Of course it is 
possible that some cultures would show a greater or lesser tendency toward polarization; this would be 
an extremely interesting area for empirical study. 
26 See D.G. Myers, ‘Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization’, (1975) 28 Human Relations 699.  
27 Brown, supra note, at 224.  [Query author] 
28 D.G. Myers and G.D. Bishop, ‘The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in Group Discussion’, 
(1976) 20 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 286. 
29 See ibid.  
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discussion, to hold that belief with considerable confidence; that people tending to 
believe in the inferiority of a certain racial group will become more entrenched in this 
belief as a result of discussion. For present purposes, group polarization is important 
because it shows how groups tend to move. If some members of a group can be 
convinced to shift their position, the group’s middle will shift as well, and quite large 
changes can be anticipated. 
All this is quite abstract. The central question remains: How might 





EDUCATION AND INFORMATION 
 
Suppose that people are engaging in activity that involves harm to self or to others; for 
simplicity, assume that the activity is not itself criminal. From the standpoint of the 
New Progressivism, hoping not to intrude on rights and to respect democratic ideals, 
the first prescription is simple: Inform people. With respect to cigarette smoking and 
unsafe sex, for example, a great deal of risky behaviour comes simply from a lack of 
information. Evidence shows that by itself, information, if it can be made salient and 
vivid, produces substantial changes in behaviour. In Thailand, a revelation that 44 per 
cent of sex workers in Chiang Mai were infected with HIV appears to have 
contributed to a substantial increase in the use of condoms. Growth in condom use in 
the United States in the 1980s was driven largely by information. Public information 
campaigns, use of the mass media, and face-to-face education and training 
programmes are all able to help.30 
This should hardly be surprising. But there is a somewhat more subtle point. It 
is possible to produce information-induced norm cascades, in which social norms, and 
social meanings, change dramatically as a result of changes in beliefs. In the United 
States, this has happened with large-scale shifts in judgments about cigarette smoking 
and, in the early 1990s, with large-scale shifts in judgments about both sexual 
                                                 




harassment and risky sex. One of the causes and consequences of these shifts has been 
a change in the relevant social meaning. Consider smoking: Whereas smokers were 
once thought to be doing something entirely normal, so that objecting nonsmokers 
were prissy intermeddlers, now smokers are thought to be doing something aggressive 
and possibly injurious, so that they are expected to apologize and to ask permission. 
The same has happened in many domains for sexual harassment and risky sex. What 
once seemed normal and even bold now seems abnormal and objectionable. A key 
question is whether dissemination of more information about harm-producing activity 
can produce large-scale changes in behavior. Often it seems to do precisely that. 
COSTS AND NORMS 
 
Of course information is unlikely to do enough. People who engage in risky behaviour 
sometimes know that their behaviour is risky. People who fail to recycle, or who 
otherwise create environmental harm, often know what they are doing. People who 
engage in discrimination often mistake no facts. New Progressivists seek, in such 
circumstances, to produce initiatives that will increase the benefits or decrease the 
(pecuniary or non-pecuniary) costs of desirable behaviour, and decrease the benefits 
or increase the (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) costs of undesirable behaviour. Efforts to 
change norms might play a role in these efforts. 
In the context of risk-creating behaviour, it is often easy to think of methods in 
this vein. People might, for example, be required to wear seatbelts, or to use helmets 
when riding motorcycles. Such programmes impose sanctions on violators. 
Sometimes subsidies are better than sanctions. In the context of the HIV/AIDS crisis, 
condom-marketing programmes have often been demonstrably successful. Such 
programmes involve public subsidization of condoms, and also make condoms easily 
available by selling them at a wide range of places. Part of the goal of such 
programmes is to ‘show condom use as normal, healthy, and even fun’.31 Especially 
when targeted at high-risk areas and poor households, such programmes have been 
exceedingly beneficial, producing significant increases in condom sales and use—in 
Thailand, for example, a 90 per cent level of condom use in commercial sex.  
Some aggressive action would involve efforts to alter the social meaning of 
risk-producing activity, partly through creative private-public partnerships. In many 
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places in the world, use of a condom is an accusation or a confession. But in others, 
the failure to use a condom reflects a kind of irresponsibility, a willingness to risk the 
life of another person. The most promising policies make condom use appear routine 
and responsible, and hardly an act of cowardice, or a violation of the goals of the 
underlying activity. 
There is a particularly important point here: Norms are most easily changed 
when the relevant population is young. With respect to HIV/AIDS, environmental 
harm, and crime, many members of the target group are in the process of developing 
their own norms. To the extent that government can work with that population, 
helping to create norms that produce benefit rather than harm, there is much to be 
gained. For HIV/AIDS in particular, an absolutely central goal in this regard should 
be to ensure equality on the basis of gender with respect to sexual relations—an idea 
that calls for prohibitions, through law and norms, on sexual coercion of all kinds, 
principally via rape, but through other forms of force as well. ‘No’ should be 
understood to mean ‘no’; ‘only with a condom’ should be understood to mean exactly 
that. In fact a democracy is especially well situated to make progress here, because 
under good conditions, there is no sharp separation between the citizenry and the 
government. 
 
CRIME: ORDER MAINTENANCE AND CONTAGION 
 
Crimes are violations of people’s rights. But why do people commit crimes? No 
simple answer would make sense. Undoubtedly poverty and desperation are much of 
the answer, But part of the answer also lies in people’s perceptions of what other 
people do. With respect to crime, people often do not know what, exactly, they should 
do, and what they do depends crucially on what they see other people doing. 
Criminality, and law-abiding behavior, appear to be contagious.  
If most people think that many people are engaging in crime, crime will 
increase. If most people think that few people are criminals, criminal activity will be 
less likely. The bad news is that all societies are vulnerable to ‘crime cascades’, as 
people take their cues from others. The good news is that this fact can be enlisted in 
the service of crime prevention. In both the United States and England, efforts have 
                                                                                                                                            
31 Ibid. at 3.   [Query author] 
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been made, with considerable success, to use order maintenance and community 
policing in the interest of ‘legality cascades’. In various contexts, an understanding of 
group polarization can help explain the underlying social dynamics. 
In the 1990s, for example, New York saw a dramatic decrease in crime—not 
merely in murder (40 per cent), but also in burglary (over 25 per cent) and robbery 
(over 30 per cent). A significant contributing factor stems from the ‘fixing broken 
windows’ approach to crime prevention. The basic idea is that both law-abiding 
citizens and potential law-breakers learn a great deal from the presence of order or 
disorder; people who obey the law are less likely to use the streets in the presence of 
disorder, and prospective criminals are more likely to engage in criminal activity, 
taking disorder as a signal about what is possible. But if minor problems—such as 
begging, graffiti, prostitution, loitering, littering, and broken windows are sharply 
reduced—the signals will be very different, and more serious crimes will decline too. 
On this view, efforts to stop or reverse a crime epidemic at the very start, through 
seemingly small changes in context, can have large beneficial consequences.  
This is the core of the ‘order maintenance’ approach to crime. In 1993, New 
York started to attempt to maintain social order and to give new signals to prospective 
criminals—by focusing on seemingly small criminal actions, such as aggressive 
begging, public drunkenness, prostitution, and vandalism. In the view of some 
observers, the lesson of New York’s successful attack on crime is that a crime 
epidemic can be reversed by altering relatively small details of the immediate 
environment. Whether or not this experience can be replicated in other nations in this 
precise form, the general lesson remains. Prospective criminals, and prospective 
victims, act on the basis of their perceptions of what other people are going to do. 
When people think that crime is increasing, cascade effects are possible, as 
prospective victims refuse to use common areas, which become dominated by 
criminals, and people unsure whether to be criminals, taking their signals from others, 
often choose the socially undesirable course. Happily, the opposite can happen when 
people are given signals that crime is decreasing. Policy initiatives that alter signals 






NO PANACEAS, BUT CLUES 
 
There are no panaceas in the ideas outlined here. The most basic suggestion is that 
individuals act in accordance with prevailing norms, and hence it is possible to induce 
large behavioural shifts. Social cascades are common, and they are often produced by 
the availability heuristic, acting in combination with social influences and group 
polarization. With respect to harm-producing conduct, these phenomena hold out a 
great deal of hope. The best approach is to be simultaneously experimental and 
optimistic. Initiatives should be monitored, and if one initiative fails, another might 
succeed—an evident conclusion of the most successful participants in Dorner’s 
experiments.  
 
Employment and Poverty: Supplementing, Not Displacing, Markets 
 
In this section I turn from social norms to issues of deprivation and poverty. I do so 
principally by comparing three ways of responding to deprivation in the employment 
market, deprivation that usually produces poverty, through joblessness or low wages. 
These ways are associated respectively with markets, planning, and the New 
Progressivism. My general suggestion is that a New Progressivist government should 
generally refuse to block exchanges between contracting parties. It should respond 
instead by providing economic help directly to those who need help. These ‘market 
supplementing’ approaches are to be preferred to ‘market displacing’ approaches 
characteristic of the way of planning.  Market supplementing approaches do not 
intrude on liberty or rights; they are less likely to reduce economic growth; they are 
also more likely to be successful. 
Those who favour the way of markets tend to respond to poverty either with 
nothing or with a social safety net, and not a very generous one at that. For many 
people, these weak responses amount to a rights violation. Those who favour the way 
of planning respond with high minimum wages, aggressive regulation of the labour 
market and the housing market, and a generous social safety net. Those who endorse 
the New Progressivism reject both approaches. They place the highest premium on 
three strategies: (1) education and training; (2) taxpayer-supported wage and housing 
subsidies; and (3) incentives to companies to increase the likelihood that they will 
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locate in poor areas and hire people who would otherwise lack work (‘empowerment 
zones’ and ‘enterprise zones’). Above all, they believe that no citizen should be poor 
if she is willing and able to work, that everyone should be able to work, and that in 
the absence of special circumstances (disability, obligations to others), almost 
everyone should be willing to work. This is the sense in which New Progressivists 
endorse the Third Way idea that there should be ‘no rights without responsibilities’. 
 
BLOCKED EXCHANGES AS MESS 
 
Well-motivated planners often try to protect people by ‘blocking exchanges’, through, 
for example, minimal rights that employees, consumers, and tenants must enjoy, and 
may not waive, even through voluntary agreements. In the market, and particularly in 
the labour market, a common justification for this form of regulation is redistribution, 
in particular redistribution to those who need help. Strategies of this kind are often 
thought to protect basic rights. 
National legislatures often impose controls on the market to prevent what it 
sees as exploitation or unfair dealing by employers, who seem to have a competitive 
advantage over workers, especially poor workers.  Those who favour a New 
Progressivism sympathize with the goals here, but they believe that this approach 
suffers from many of the problems faced by Dorner’s planners. New Progressivists 
thus have a presumption against this approach, because they do not believe that it is, 
in general, a good way to help people who need help. The presumption is certainly 
rebuttable; sometimes blocked exchanges can do some good. But New Progressivists 
generally seek to help workers through other means—through, for example, earned 
income tax credits, income supplements, subsidized housing, and education and 
training. 
To be sure, many agreements between employers and employees seem and are 
harsh, and the claim for redistribution is often a powerful one as a matter of basic 
principle. Workers often enter into unjust deals, simply because their options are so 
few. In fact market wages and prices depend on a wide range of factors that are 
morally irrelevant: historical injustice; supply and demand curves at any particular 
point; variations in family structure and opportunities for education and employment; 
existing tastes; and perhaps even differences in initial endowments, including talents, 
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intelligence, or physical strength. If the regulation could be made effective and does 
not produce high ancillary costs (an important qualification), government should not 
always take these factors as ‘natural’, or let them be turned into social disadvantages. 
The inspiration for minimum wage legislation, for example, is easy to identify. So too, 
rent control legislation prevents tenants from being subject to unanticipated price 
increases and perhaps thrown into significantly inferior housing; and implied 
warranties of habitability protect tenants from living in disgraceful and indeed 
dangerous apartments. 
In all these cases, however, regulation may well be a poor mechanism for 
redistributing resources, precisely because it is often self-defeating. The problem is 
that if everything else is held constant, the market will frequently adjust to the 
imposition of regulation in a way that will harm many people, including the least 
well-off.  This is not a claim that markets have any moral status; it is a claim that 
blocking exchanges is often a doomed way of doing what well-motivated planners are 
seeking to do, that is, to help poor people. 
Hence, for example, it is a mistake—we might even call it the defining 
mistake of planners—to assume that regulation will directly transfer resources or 
create only after-the-fact winners and losers (an idea exemplified by the assumption 
that the only effect of the minimum wage is to raise wages for those currently 
working, or that the only effect of protecting tenants against eviction is to allow poor 
tenants to retain housing).  In ordinary circumstances, an important consequence of a 
high minimum wage is to increase unemployment by raising the price of marginal 
labour. Those at the bottom of the ladder—the most vulnerable members of society—
are the victims. In a rich nation with a growing economy and a low unemployment 
rate, a high minimum wage law might not do much harm, and might well do enough 
good to be justified on balance. But in a country that is not rich, and that has a high 
unemployment rate, there is reason to be doubtful of high minimum wage 
requirements, simply because they impair economic development, and further do not 
redistribute resources from employers to poor workers (which would be good), but 
end up hurting the poorest people of all, who are less likely to be able to obtain jobs. 
In fact—and this is a separate problem with blocking exchanges as a method 
of redistribution—a minimum wage is not directly targeted at poor people at all. In 
many nations, those who benefit from the minimum wage have other sources of 
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income. In the United States, for example, an increase in the minimum wage goes 
largely to middle-income (39.5 per cent) and upper-income (34.7 per cent) citizens, 
and only about 25 per cent goes to the poor (13.1 per cent) and near-poor (12.7 per 
cent).32 Of course minimum wage workers are usually far from wealthy. But the 
problem with regulations blocking exchanges is that they are not specifically targeted 
at the poor. They help those who do not need help, or who do not have the strongest 
claim to help, and thus waste resources that might be better used elsewhere. 
In the same vein, rent control legislation and implied warranties of habitability 
create incentives for producers (landlords) to leave the housing market, and 
disincentives for people to enter that market. This has perverse redistributive 
consequences and especially harsh results for the poor, who may be left without 
housing at all. It should be obvious that the beneficiaries of rent control legislation 
need not be poor and often are not poor. In the United States, it should not be 
surprising to find that Cambridge, Massachusetts has experienced a dramatic growth 
in new housing since rent control was eliminated by state referendum. 
I have said that blocking exchanges is not always a bad idea. Minimum wage 
legislation does, after all, raise the wages of the working poor, and in some 
circumstances—especially but not only those of sustained economic growth—the 
disemployment effects will be small or nonexistent. But there can be little doubt that 
interference with the labour market will produce losers as well as winners. Efforts to 
redistribute resources through regulation can therefore have serious perverse results.33 
The point bears on regulation of the labour market, the housing market, and the 
market for ordinary goods and services. It counsels against anything that looks like 
‘price fixing’ as a redistributive strategy. 
                                                 
32 See Daniel Shaviro, ‘The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy 
Policy’, (1997) 64 University of Chicago Law Review 405, 435. 
33 Two qualifications are necessary here.  First, the redistributive regulation, though in some ways 
perverse, might be part of a system of redistribution that is effective overall.  A minimum wage law 
might be justified as a means of protecting the working poor if it is accompanied by a welfare system to 
take care of those who cannot work at all.  For this reason, plausible arguments can be made for the 
minimum wage. The only point is that if it is too costly to employers, substantial disemployment 
effects are inevitable.  
The second qualification is that some laws that seem to be justified on redistributive grounds 
are best understood as a response to inadequate information. Occupational safety and health legislation 
does not transfer resources from employers to employees; but it may be justified as a response to the 
fact that workers lack information about workplace risks. In the face of inadequate information, a 
regulatory response may well make sense. But an analysis based on inadequate information will be 
very different from one based on redistribution. If the problem is inadequate information, the first step 






Thus far I have been discussing what the New Progressivism opposes. What does it 
support instead? The answer is not reliance on markets alone. New Progressivists 
firmly believe that simple and even effective redistribution, such as cash grants to the 
poor from taxpayer funds, are justified in principle. They believe in a social safety 
net; in this way they accept the South African approach, which understands the 
category of rights to include gross deprivation of basic needs. But they do not believe 
that planners offer promising responses to poverty, unemployment, and general 
deprivation. Instead New Progressivists emphasize approaches that will give people 
an ability to help themselves, through education, training, and job opportunities, 
fuelled by economic incentives in the form (for example) of tax credits to employers 
and employees alike. They seek to supplement rather than to displace markets. 
In case there was any doubt, a recent study of South Africa, based on 1996 
data, shows the enormous importance of education to employment prospects.34 The 
study shows that high ratios of teachers to students dramatically increase the 
likelihood of employment—with a statistically significant effect for males, and a very 
large effect for females. The authors conclude that the apartheid ‘system continues to 
profoundly influence the life chances of many Black Africans, through its long lasting 
effects on the country’s education system. Many Black Africans currently in the labor 
force attended schools with inadequately trained teachers, insufficient textbooks, and 
pupil-teacher ratios above 80 children per class.’ The result of all this is to decrease 
both years in school and employment prospects. Better education and training is the 
most direct and effective way of helping people to obtain jobs and decent wages. 
For many people, of course, other steps are required. A central New 
Progressivist approach is to develop systems to supplement low wages. A key here is 
to generate a strategy that will neither (a) discourage employers from hiring people 
nor (b) discourage prospective workers from seeking employment. Many countries 
have experimented with some variation on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  
Under this approach, working people (the programme may or may not be limited to 
 27 
 
people with children) who earn low wages obtain a tax credit from the government, 
sufficient to raise their total compensation to a decent level. The tax credit is phased 
out once workers receive money above a certain level. In the United States, for 
example, someone who earns an income of about $10,000 will receive about $3800 at 
tax time; a mother and father who earn $25,000 will receive about $1200 at tax time. 
In the United States alone, the EITC has been a terrific success, lifting millions of 
people from poverty. In 1996 alone, the effect of the EITC was to take 4.6 million 
people, including 2.4 million children, out of poverty.35 
Compared to planning-type initiatives, there are three large advantages to the 
EITC approach. The first is that unlike the minimum wage, it does not make labour 
more costly for employers, and thus does not decrease employers’ desire to hire 
people. The second is that it increases people’s incentives to work, by making work 
more remunerative. The third is that unlike the minimum wage, the EITC is genuinely 
and specifically targeted at people who are poor. In the United States, for example, 
nearly three-quarters of those who benefit from the EITC are poor or near-poor.36 The 
EITC is the model of a New Progressivism antipoverty programme. 
Creative policymakers could easily build on this model—and use it as an 
alternative to well-motivated but crude plans. Planners interested in protecting tenants 
might, for example, impose ceilings on rent increases. Those interested in protecting 
those dependent on certain important commodities might impose price ceilings. If the 
government is interested in ensuring that tenants cannot be evicted for nonpayment of 
rent, it might impose large procedural hurdles to eviction. If decent housing is 
unavailable, government might build housing on its own. These strategies are all 
associated with planning, and they might do some good. But New Progressivists 
would look for alternatives. They might seek, for example, to provide housing 
vouchers to poor people, or to provide food stamps to those who are unable to buy 
enough to eat.  
More generally, New Progressivists would urge government to build 
‘empowerment zones’ or ‘enterprise zones’ in poor communities, by giving 
                                                                                                                                            
34 Anne Case and Motohiro Yogo, Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and 
Characteristics of Schools in South Africa [1999 draft, available on the Social Science Research 
Network (SSRN)]. 
35 Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, ‘The Earned Income Tax Credit’, Issue Brief No. 1., The Century 
Foundation (September 1999). 
36 Shaviro, n. 31 above, at 435. 
 28 
 
businesses a tax credit, or direct subsidies, to the extent that they are willing to locate 
in areas that need help, and to employ people who need jobs. These are market-
oriented strategies that do not make a fetish of market ordering. They deploy markets 
in the interest of human goals. Learning from the failures and half-successes of 
planning, those who use such strategies attempt to be like the successful participants 
in Dorner’s experiments, whose interventions are alert to the potentially harmful side-
effects of intrusions into systems. 
 
Command and Control Regulation: A Presumption Against 
 
In controlling pollution and other social harms, a number of states, including some of 
the most proudly capitalist, have engaged in a modest form of ‘planning’, through 
command-and-control regulation. Such regulation involves centralized regulatory 
requirements imposed on dozens, hundreds, thousands, or even millions of producers. 
As examples, consider air pollution control requirements, imposed on new cars and 
trucks; ‘best available technology’ (BAT) requirements, imposed on polluting firms; 
and specified levels of mandatory pollution reductions, imposed on companies of 
various kinds. Similar approaches can be found in the area of occupational safety, 
where national authorities sometimes specify the safety technologies and approaches 
that must be used by all or most firms. 
It is important to acknowledge that in many states, command-and-control 
regulation has accomplished significant good. Planning of this form has hardly been a 
complete failure. In the United States, it has helped produce dramatic reductions in 
levels of air and water pollution. Reliance on markets alone would have been far 
worse. In this domain, the way of planning is far better than the way of markets. But 
for several reasons, the New Progressivism rejects the basic approach. They are 
concerned that command-and-control approaches will compromise economic 
development and also undermine democracy. 
The first problem is that it is usually unnecessarily expensive, even wasteful 
for government to prescribe the means for achieving social objectives. At least as a 
general rule, it is especially inefficient for government to dictate technology. One of 
the many problems with BAT strategies, for example, is that they ignore the enormous 
differences among plants and industries and among geographical areas. It is not 
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sensible to impose the same technology on industries in diverse areas—regardless of 
whether they are polluted or clean, populated or empty, or expensive or cheap to clean 
up. BAT strategies also require all new industries to adopt costly technology, and 
allow more lenient standards to be imposed on existing plants and industries. Through 
this route BAT strategies actually penalize new products, thus discouraging 
investment and perpetuating old, dirty technology. The result is inefficiency in 
investment strategies, in innovation, and even in environmental protection.  Such 
strategies also fail to encourage new pollution control technology and indeed serve to 
discourage it by requiring its adoption for no financial gain. In general, governmental 
specification of the ‘means’ of achieving desired ends is a good way of producing 
unnecessarily high costs. Instead of permitting industry and consumers to choose the 
‘means’—and thus to impose a form of market discipline on that question—
government often selects the means in advance. The governmentally-prescribed 
means are often the most inefficient. 
More fundamentally, command-and-control approaches are severely deficient 
from the standpoint of democracy. The focus on the question of ‘means’ tends to 
increase the power of well-organized private groups, by allowing them to press 
environmental and regulatory law in the service of their own parochial ends. The BAT 
approach, for example, ensures that citizens and representatives will be focusing their 
attention not on what levels of reduction are appropriate, but instead on the largely 
incidental and nearly impenetrable question of what technologies are now available. 
Because of its sheer complexity, this issue is not easily subject to democratic 
resolution. Moreover, the issue is not the relevant one for democratic politics, which 
is the appropriate degree and nature of environmental protection—an issue to which 
the BAT question is only incidental.  
The approach favoured by the New Progressivism is much simpler: (1) begin 
by informing people about risks, including environmental risks, and (2) where this is 
inadequate, impose a tax on harmful behaviour, and let market forces determine the 
response to the increased cost. Thus governments might adopt a simple, two-step 
reform policy in the area of social risks and social harms. First, those who impose 
harm must pay for it—by purchasing permission to do so, perhaps through a licensing 
procedure. Second, those who obtain the resulting permission should be able to trade 
their ‘licenses’ with other people. In the pollution context, this would mean that 
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people who reduce their pollution below a specified level could trade their ‘pollution 
rights’ for cash. In one stroke, such a system would create market-based disincentives 
to pollute and market-based incentives for pollution control. Such a system would also 
reward rather than punish technological innovation in pollution control, and do so 
with the aid of private markets. An idea of this kind might be made part and parcel of 
a system of ‘green taxes’. With such a system, nations might impose taxes on people 
who impose harms on others—users of dirty automobiles, farmers who employ 
pesticides, coal-fired power plants, gasoline that produces air pollution, products that 
contribute to destruction of the ozone layer or the greenhouse effect.  
Economic incentives could be applied in other areas as well. Workers' 
compensation plans, for example, operate as effective guarantees of workplace safety. 
According to a careful study, ‘[i]f the safety incentives of workers' compensation 
were removed, fatality rates in the United States economy would increase by almost 
30 percent. Over 1200 more workers would die from job injuries every year in the 
absence of the safety incentives provided by workers' compensation.’37 This contrasts 
with a mere 2-4 per cent reduction in injuries from the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA), an amount that links up well with the fact that annual workers' 
compensation premiums are more than 1000 times as large as total annual OSHA 
penalties. The tax system could be used to provide better incentives to employers who 
furnish dangerous workplaces. The consumer product safety commission might 
experiment with a system in which producers of harm-producing products must pay a 
fee into the federal treasury. Ultimately, we might hope for a coordinated system of 
risk regulation, one that imposed specified fees for harm-producing activities. 
For democracy, such an approach would have significant consequences, and 
these consequences would be extremely beneficial. The large question—how much 
environmental protection at what cost—does not easily permit legislators to favor a 
well-organized, narrow group, such as the agricultural lobby, or the coal lobby. 
Special favours cannot readily be provided through a system of economic incentives. 
The very generality of the question will work against narrow favouritism. 
The international movement toward economic incentives, a central part of the 
New Progressivism, is preliminary but real. Thus far, it has occurred mostly in the 
environmental area. An important series of administrative initiatives have brought 
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about ‘emissions trading’, especially under the American Clean Air Act.38 Under the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s policy, a firm that reduces its emissions below 
legal requirements may obtain ‘credits’ that can be used against higher emissions 
elsewhere. Overall, the programme has produced savings of between $525 million and 
$12 billion.39 By any measure, this is an enormous gain. On balance, moreover, the 
environmental consequences have been beneficial. Offsets must, by definition, 
produce environmental gains. The preliminary evidence shows favourable effects 
from bubbles as well. There may be modest beneficial effects from banking and 
modest adverse effects from netting. The overall environmental effect is therefore 
good, cost entirely to one side. 
As part of the process for eliminating lead from gasoline—a decision that was, 
not incidentally, strongly supported by a cost-benefit study—the EPA also permitted 
emissions trading. Under this policy, a refinery that produced gasoline with lower 
than required lead levels could earn credits. These could be traded with other 
refineries or banked for future use. Until the termination of the programme in 1987, 
when the phase-down of lead ended, emissions credits for lead were widely traded. 
EPA concluded that there had been cost savings of about 20 per cent over alternative 
systems, marking total savings in the hundreds of million of dollars. There have been 
similar efforts with water pollution and ozone depletion.40  
Perhaps the most dramatic programme of economic incentives can be found in 
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Act now explicitly creates an 
emissions trading system for the control of acid deposition. In these amendments, 
Congress has made an explicit decision about aggregate emission levels for a 
pollutant. Whether the particular decision is the correct one may be disputed. But 
surely there are large democratic benefits from ensuring that public attention is 
focused on that issue. There are palpable economic benefits as well. The system for 
controlling acid deposition is billions of dollars less expensive than the command-
and-control alternatives. 
                                                                                                                                            
37 W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability, (1991) 178. 
38See Environment Protection Agency, ‘Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for 
Creation, Banking, and Use of Emission Reduction Credits’, (1986) 51 Federal Regulations 43,814. 
39 See Hahn & Hester, ‘Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice’, (1989) 16 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 361, 374 table 2.  [Query author – names or initials?] 
40On ozone depletion, see 53 Federal Regulations 30,566 (August 11, 1988); on water pollution, see 
Hahn & Stavns, ‘Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era From An Old Idea’, (1991) 
18 Ecology Law Quarterly 1, 18-19. [Query author – names or initials?] 
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The idea can be adapted to many domains. Consider, for example, the African 
Elephant Conservation Act, which created a two-prong strategy to combat species 
loss. These included cooperative conservation projects and strict import controls for 
countries with endangered elephant populations. The United States would not import 
from any such country; but once a nation was able to stabilize its elephant population 
and to receive a new listing, it would be permitted to engage in the trade of ivory. In a 
way this policy might seem worse than a flat ban on ivory trade. But in practice, it has 
worked far better, because it creates an incentive to have sizeable herds. In many 
cases, elephants were ‘owned’ and protected by the relevant communities, increasing 
efforts to quash poaching in the knowledge that they would be economically better off 
if they were able to be listed as having stabilized their elephant population. The Act 
has been extremely successful, and served as the model for the subsequent Rhinoceros 
and Tiger Act and the Asian Elephant Act. Nations interested in preserving their own 
environmental goods, including endangered species, might well build on this idea. 
 
Economic Growth, Capabilities, and Sex Equality 
 
GROWTH AND ITS LIMITS 
 
Thus far I have dealt with New Progressivist means—stressing the need to attend to 
both incentives and norms, and to avoid the crudeness associated with many plans. It 
is now time to turn to the question of ends. That question cannot be answered without 
saying something about the relationship between economic growth, social welfare, 
and individual rights. 
For the last decades, many people have evaluated national well-being in terms 
of economic growth alone. Indeed, this approach has been characteristic of those who 
emphasize the way of markets; and much of the time, it has been adopted by those 
who attempt the way of planning as well. On this view, a nation’s performance is 
assessed by asking about Gross Domestic Product, and by seeing its movement over 
time.  
Certainly GDP is a useful figure, for it bears a relationship to important social 
goals.  If we think of income as an all-purpose means—as something that people want 
regardless of what else they want—we might well attend to GDP. Though its 
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importance is merely instrumental, growth does matter for a wide range of important 
goals. Thus a recent study of anti-poverty measures in the United States, by someone 
well-disposed to government programmes and unenthusiastic about the way of 
markets, announces as Lesson 1, ‘A strong macroeconomy matters more than 
anything else.’41 Well-protected property rights and freedom of contract, protected by 
state institutions, are quite central to economic growth.42 They are at least as 
important in poor countries as in rich ones. 
There are, however, a number of problems with relying on GDP as a measure 
of well-being. 
The most obvious problem involves distributional considerations. If income is 
unequally distributed, a high GDP may disguise the fact that many people are living 
bad or even desperate lives. For example, the United States has the highest per capita 
real GDP in the world. But it also has a higher rate of children living in poverty—
about one in five—than does any other wealthy country in the world.  The rate of 
children living in poverty is double that of the industrialized nations taken as a whole 
and four times that of Western Europe. Nearly half of all black children in the United 
States live in poverty.  While white Americans, if taken separately, would rank first 
on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index, 
African-Americans, if taken separately, would rank somewhere in the thirties. These 
crucial economic facts are undisclosed by GDP. And if deprivation is seen as a rights 
violation, economic growth can conceal substantial rights violations. 
GDP sometimes seems to be a general placeholder for a number of diverse 
indicators of social and economic well-being. But in fact, it may not be closely 
correlated with some important indicators. Consider two major social goals: reduction 
of poverty and reduction of unemployment. Of course GDP growth can be an 
important factor in counteracting both unemployment and poverty. But it is also 
possible for GDP increases to be accompanied by increases in unemployment and 
hence poverty (which is closely correlated with unemployment); indeed, this 
phenomenon has often occurred. Or consider the likelihood of subjection to violent 
crime. Physical security is surely an important ingredient in well-being, but it is at 
best indirectly reflected in GDP. Consider also the fact that there is no inevitable 
                                                 
41 Rebecca Black, ‘Fighting Poverty: Lessons from Recent US History’, (2000) 14 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 3, 6. 
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connection between GDP and life expectancy. Some countries have a relatively low 
GDP but long life expectancy and low rates of infant mortality.  Many countries have 
a high GDP but do poorly in promoting longevity. Education is an important part of a 
good life, whether or not educated people accumulate wealth; but the association 
between education and GDP, while real, is extremely crude. 
GDP also fails to account for goods and services that are free, including some 
that are closely connected with economic well-being.  For example, unpaid domestic 
labour is not a part of GDP. Many environmental amenities, such as clean air and 
water, are not reflected in GDP. The GDP figure thus fails adequately to measure 
either the benefits of a healthy environment or the costs of its degradation. There are 
other gaps in what GDP measures. It does not, for example, reflect changes in leisure 
time; but it is clear that any increase in leisure is a gain even in economic terms, since 
leisure is something for which people are willing to pay, sometimes a great deal. Most 
generally, a serious problem with GDP is that the figure excludes all social costs and 
benefits that do not have prices. 
The most general point is that GDP does not adequately capture what a good 
society is concerned to ensure. Responding to these points, many people have 
attempted to come up with other measures of national well-being. Of these the 
UNDP’s effort is the best known. The UNDP uses an index of well-being based on 
per capita income, educational attainment, and longevity. In 1999, South Africa was 
ranked 101 on the list, below China, Turkey, Georgia, and Albania.  Some of the key 
numbers include a life expectancy at birth of 54.7 years, an adult literacy rate of 84 
per cent, and real GDP per capita of $7,380. The most striking number here is the low 
life expectancy number—below, for example, that of Bangladesh, Nepal, India, and 
Pakistan.  
Of course any ‘index’ is bound to have a degree of arbitrariness. What is 
important is that a nation with a low GDP can also give its citizens long lives and a 
good education—and that a nation with a high GDP can give its citizens a poor 
education and relatively low life expectancies. (On the latter point, the United States 
is an unfortunate case, with an extremely high per capita income but one of the lowest 
life expectancies among comparable countries.) The theoretical roots of these efforts 
to go beyond GDP lie in the ‘capabilities approach’, which attempts to assess ‘what 
                                                                                                                                            
42 See Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (1999). 
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people are actually able to do and to be’.43 (We can view the capabilities approach as 
an effort, within both economics and philosophy, to give some concrete detail to the 
aspects of human rights and ‘basic needs’.) 
The central idea, rooted in a notion of human dignity, is that a nation should 
ensure not ‘satisfaction of preferences’, and not a certain level of resources, but 
instead an ability to choose what kind of life to have. Of course preferences and 
beliefs may well adapt to existing deprivation—a common phenomenon, and one that 
creates serious problems for the way of markets insofar as that way makes 
‘preferences’ determinative of social policy. Nor should it be contentious to urge that 
certain capabilities are necessary to a decent human life. These include the ability to 
live a decently long life, to have good health, to participate in political choices that 
affect one’s life, to be educated, to hold property.44 When people lack one or more of 
these abilities, they suffer from ‘capability failure’, and this is the problem to which 
government should respond. The minimal responsibility of a New Progressivist 
government is to ensure that all citizens are able to come above a certain threshold. 
The less minimal obligation is to ensure that all citizens have more than minimal 
capabilities on all of these dimensions.  
This general idea cannot without arbitrariness be turned into a formula or 
index. But insofar as the Human Development Index, and related efforts, go beyond 
GDP to provide a simple, salient, easily understood figure by which to facilitate 
international comparisons and changes over time, they are a good place to start. They 
also provide a great deal of help with priority-setting. In the United States, Finland, 
Botswana and South Africa, for example, it is clear that a large premium should be 
placed on improving longevity; the citizens of these nations can expect relatively 
short lives, undoubtedly in part as a result of high levels of crime and low levels of 
health care. By contrast, Sweden, New Zealand, Cuba and Georgia should concentrate 
on increasing economic growth; all of these nations provide decent education, and 
relatively long lives, but keep their citizens relatively poor.   
 
The Anticaste Principle—and the Centrality of Sex Equality 
 
                                                 
43 See Nussbaum, n. 3 above, at 5. 
44 See ibid. at 78-80. 
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CASTE AND ANTICASTE 
 
The capabilities approach gives a sense of the New Progressivist account of liberty; 
but it says little about equality. For New Progressivists, I have suggested it is 
important to ensure that everyone has decent life prospects, and also that everyone 
comes over a ‘capability threshold’. But a separate and equally central equality goal is 
the attack on any situation in which some people, defined in terms of a morally 
irrelevant characteristic, are treated as second-class citizens, or turned into members 
of a lower caste. Thus an anticaste principle, undergirding a constitutional equality 
norm, plays a large role in New Progressivist thinking.  
The anticaste principle is not a thoroughly egalitarian goal. It is compatible 
with large disparities in wealth and resources. But it insists that morally irrelevant 
characteristics, such as race, religion, and gender, should not be turned into a basis for 
second-class citizenship. Thus New Progressivists see one of the most serious 
inequality problems of the twentieth century in the pervasive practice of seizing on a 
characteristic lacking moral relevance, and using it as the basis for the systematic 
subordination of members of certain social groups. This conception of equality is 
opposed to several others, including the ‘formal equality’ principle, which does not 
focus attention on systematic subordination, and indeed which sees efforts to 
counteract such subordination as a form of discrimination. Commitment to the 
anticaste principle hardly exhausts the domain of rights. But it is an important 




SEX EQUALITY AS A CENTRAL GOAL, AS A MEANS AND AN END 
 
For developing and wealthy countries alike, an end to sexual hierarchy is an 
especially high priority—as both a means and an end. With respect to many 
problems—HIV/AIDS, crime, economic growth and overpopulation—there are few 
higher priorities. Indeed any generalized attack on poverty must be combined with an 
attack on sexual hierarchy. The two are closely intermingled problems. 
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Note first that sex equality is an important means to human development, as 
Amartya Sen and others have shown, with their particular emphasis on ‘women’s 
agency’.45 A nation in which girls and women have a chance to do and to be what 
they want to do and to be is much likelier to develop and to develop well.  A nation 
with sexual hierarchy is far more likely to suffer economically and in other ways. In 
fact a system of equality on the basis of sex is likely to redress many problems not 
normally thought to be associated with it, such as overpopulation and the individual 
and social drains that come from unwanted children. When women have a range of 
opportunities, and when their choices are not a product of deprivation, these problems 
are sharply diminished. If women are able to decide whether to have children, 
unwanted children are less likely, and children who are unwanted are far more likely 
to suffer and to make society suffer in response, sometimes through criminal 
behaviour. If women have agency, many crimes will be reduced as a result, 
emphatically including sex crimes. If women have agency, the economy will do 
better, simply because there will be more people willing and able to do good work. If 
women have agency, there will be an immediate and substantial reduction in the 
AIDS crisis, simply because women will be able to engage in sexual relations only 
when they want, and on the terms that they choose. This is a potentially enormous 
benefit for men and women alike, and for adults and children alike as well. 
This idea has many implications. It means that education and training for girls 
are crucial. It also means that by both law and norms, girls and women should be 
allowed to decide when and whether to become mothers—which means, among other 
things, that sexual relations should always be a choice, not a requirement. Here there 
is an evident link to the earlier discussion of norms and norm cascades, and a 
particular link to the problems of crime and HIV/AIDS. In fact a social policy directed 





I have attempted in this essay to clarify the relationships among rights, democracy, 
and economic growth, endorsing in the process a New Progressivism. Of course it is 
                                                 
45 See Sen and Dreze, n. 4 above. 
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possible to conceive of rights, and of democracy, in a way that leads to great tension 
with economic growth. But we can also understand democracy in deliberative terms, 
in a way that reduces the tension with both rights and growth. We can also understand 
rights in a way that makes economic growth their alley rather than their adversary. 
Rights in general depend on a certain degree of economy development, simply 
because rights cost money. And if rights include freedom from desperate conditions, 
economic growth is extremely important.  
But it is not sufficient. Markets must be supplemented by additional efforts, 
supported by a democratic society. Too much of the time, markets do little to help 
people who face circumstances of deprivation. From the standpoint of freedom and 
justice, they are nothing to celebrate. From the standpoint of economics, this was the 
great lesson of the first half of the twentieth century. We have seen that markets are 
emphatically human products, not natural but conventional, created by law and to be 
evaluated in terms of their consequences. The question is what they do to and for the 
people who are subject to them. 
At the same time, economic planning, in its many diverse forms, is often futile 
and counterproductive, partly because of the difficulty of foreseeing the systemic 
effects of one-shot interventions. In its various guises, planning often invites interest 
group manoeuvering, thus damaging democracy, and produces unintended harmful 
consequences, notwithstanding the good intentions of many planners. This has been 
the great lesson of the second half of the twentieth century. 
In these circumstances, any New Progressivism, to be worthy of use, should 
not be understood as a compromise measure, or as steering ‘between’ two poles. It is 
insistently and unapologetically committed to a certain understanding of the goals 
associated with social democracy in Europe and the New Deal in the United States. 
These do not include egalitarianism, understood as equal or roughly equal economic 
outcomes. But they do include decent life prospects for all, a social safety net in the 
form of adequate floors, political equality, and an anticaste principle, in the form of 
opposition to second-class citizenship for members of any social group. Attempting to 
understand social democratic goals in a coherent way, those who believe in a New 
Progressivism insist on a self-conscious effort to promote the fundamental capabilities 
of all citizens, by ensuring that everyone falls above a certain generous threshold. 
Those who endorse a New Progressivism therefore reject the idea that markets should 
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be identified with liberty at the same time that they seek to go beyond the sometimes 
sloppy and diffuse set of goals associated with the way of planning. Those who 
endorse a New Progressivism also put the highest premium on the achievement of an 
end to sexual hierarchy. 
With respect to means, New Progressivists seek a government that acts as 
catalyst; the basic goal is to create incentives that will move behaviour in desirable 
directions. New Progressivists see much planning as analogous to the hapless 
participants in Dietrich Dorner’s experiments—as ill-conceived interventions into 
systems that confound the goals of the interveners. To avoid the problem of ‘mess’, 
New Progressivism programmes are based on a presumption against blocked 
exchanges and command-and-control regulation. There is an effort to complement 
rather than to displace markets. Antipoverty programmes take the form of incentives 
to work, designed to ensure that everyone who works is able to live decently, that 
everyone has a chance to work, and that those who choose not to work have a good 
reason for not doing so. Regulatory programmes are based on a presumption in favour 
of informing people and providing economic incentives for desirable conduct.  
Finally, New Progressivists insist on the importance of civil society and above 
all of the norms that often drive behaviour. Alert to the possibility of social cascades, 
those who seek a New Progressivism insist on the provision of information, and also 
on seemingly small steps that can, under favorable conditions, have large effects on 
behaviour.  
There is no policy blueprint here. Of courlicy on a more secure sense of gose 
no country is exactly like any other. No one can design a set of policy initiatives that 
will work well, or at all, in every nation on the globe. But the problems with the way 
of markets and the way of planning are pervasive. In many nations, an alternative that 
attempts to promote human capabilities, in a way that is alert to the nature of 
incentives and the role of social norms, promises to draw on both of the great lessons 
of the twentieth century, and to build povernment’s appropriate ends, and of the 
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